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Abstract
In this article we present DUAL-PECCS, an in-
tegrated Knowledge Representation system aimed
at extending artificial capabilities in tasks such as
conceptual categorization. It relies on two different
sorts of cognitively inspired common-sense reason-
ing: prototypical reasoning and exemplars-based
reasoning. Furthermore, it is grounded on the the-
oretical tenets coming from the dual process the-
ory of the mind, and on the hypothesis of heteroge-
neous proxytypes, developed in the area of the bio-
logically inspired cognitive architectures (BICA).
The system has been integrated into the ACT-R
cognitive architecture, and experimentally assessed
in a conceptual categorization task, where a target
concept illustrated by a simple common-sense lin-
guistic description had to be identified by resort-
ing to a mix of categorization strategies. Compared
to human-level categorization, the obtained results
suggest that our proposal can be helpful in extend-
ing the representational and reasoning conceptual
capabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems.
1 Introduction
In this work we present an integrated knowledge rep-
resentation system aimed at performing conceptual cat-
egorization tasks. It is named DUAL-PECCS (Proto-
types and Exemplars-based Conceptual Categorization Sys-
tem), since it relies on two different sorts of cognitively-
inspired common-sense reasoning: prototypical reasoning
and exemplars-based reasoning. Furthermore, it is grounded
on the theoretical tenets coming from the dual process the-
ory of mind, and on the hypothesis of “heterogeneous proxy-
types” developed in the area of the biologically inspired cog-
nitive architectures (BICA).
The system aims at providing a unified framework for the
conceptual categorization simulating some of the common
sense heuristic strategies exploited by humans in categoriza-
tion tasks. More specifically, it integrates strategies based
on prototypes and exemplars-based reasoning, as suggested
by the psychological results coming form the area of ex-
perimental Cognitive Science. Furthermore, DUAL-PECCS
has been also integrated and tested in the ACT-R cogni-
tive architecture to investigate its compatibility with the
model of mind herein implemented [Anderson et al., 2004;
Langley et al., 2009].
While existing systems and architectures allow to per-
form either prototype or exemplar-based categorization rather
than autonomously adapting their strategy to the input be-
ing categorized [Anderson and Betz, 2001], conversely,
DUAL-PECCS addresses this issue. In addition to the de-
ployment of such common sense categorization strategies,
DUAL-PECCS also integrates such types of non monotonic
reasoning with the classical categorizations based on stan-
dard, deductive, processes. The flow and the interaction of
such diverse reasoning mechanisms has been devised based
on the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reason-
ing.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we in-
troduce the theoretical background inspiring our system; in
Sections 3 and 4 we illustrate the system, the implemented
categorization strategies and its integration into ACT-R; Sec-
tion 5 describes the evaluation and discusses the obtained re-
sults, and Section 6 provides an outlook on future work.
2 Prototypes, Exemplars and Proxytypes
In Cognitive Science different theories about the nature of
concepts have been proposed. According to the traditional
view, known as “classical” or Aristotelian theory, concepts
can be simply defined in terms of sets of necessary and suf-
ficient conditions. Such theory was dominant until the mid
’70s of the last Century, when Rosch’s experimental results
demonstrated its inadequacy for ordinary –or common sense–
concepts [Rosch, 1975]. Such results showed, on the other
hand, that ordinary concepts are characterized and organized
in our mind in terms of prototypes. Since then, different
theories of concepts have been proposed to explain different
representational and reasoning aspects concerning the prob-
lem of typicality: we focus here on the prototype theory and
on the exemplars theory.1 According to the prototype view,
knowledge about categories is stored in terms of prototypes,
i.e., in terms of some representation of the “best” instance
1Due to space restrictions, we briefly survey these works; full-
detailed reviews can be found in [Machery, 2009].
of the category. In this view, the concept cat should coin-
cide with the representation of a typical cat. In the simpler
versions of this approach, prototypes are represented as (pos-
sibly weighted) lists of features. According to the exemplar
view, a given category is mentally represented as set of spe-
cific exemplars explicitly stored in memory: the mental rep-
resentation of the concept cat is a set containing the represen-
tations of (some of) the cats we encountered during our past
experience.
Although these approaches have been largely considered
as competing ones (since they propose different models and
predictions about how we organize and reason on concep-
tual information), they turned out to be not mutually exclu-
sive [Malt, 1989]. Rather, they seem to succeed in explaining
different classes of cognitive phenomena, such as the fact that
human subjects use different representations to categorize
concepts: some use exemplars, a few rely on prototypes, and
often both exemplars and prototypes are employed [Smith
and Minda, 1998]. This distinction also has neural plausi-
bility, as witnessed by empirical research [Squire and Knowl-
ton, 1995]. Such experimental evidences led to the devel-
opment of the so called “heterogeneous hypothesis” about
the nature of concepts: this approach assumes that concepts
do not constitute a unitary phenomenon, and hypothesizes
that different types of conceptual representations exist: proto-
types, exemplars, classical representations, and so on [Mach-
ery, 2009]. All such representations, in this view, constitute
different bodies of knowledge and contain different types of
information associated to the the same conceptual entity (i.e.,
these different bodies of knowledge act like semantic pointers
towards the same conceptual entity [Eliasmith et al., 2012;
Thagard, 2012]). Furthermore, each body of conceptual
knowledge is featured by specific processes in which such
representations are involved (e.g., in cognitive tasks like
recognition, learning, categorization, etc.). In particular, pro-
totypes and exemplars-based representation are associated
with the possibility of dealing with non monotonic strategies
of reasoning and categorization, while the classical represen-
tations are associated with standard deductive mechanisms of
reasoning.2
In recent years an alternative theory of concepts has been
proposed: the proxytype theory; it postulates a biological lo-
calization and interaction between different brain areas for
dealing with conceptual structures, that have a direct counter-
part in the distinction between long term and working mem-
ory [Prinz, 2002]. In this setting, concepts are seen as proxy-
types.
Definition 1 (Proxytypes). Proxytype is any element of a
2Let us assume that we have to categorize a stimulus with the
following features: “it has fur, woofs and wags its tail”. In this case,
the result of a prototype-based categorization would be dog, since
these cues are associated to the prototype of dog. Prototype-based
reasoning, however, is not the only type of reasoning based on typ-
icality. In fact, if an exemplar corresponding to the stimulus being
categorized is available, too, it is acknowledged that humans use
to classify it by evaluating its similarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather
than w.r.t. the prototype associated to the underlying concepts [Frix-
ione and Lieto, 2013]. This type of common sense categorization is
known in literature as exemplars-based categorization.
complex representational network stored in long-term mem-
ory corresponding to a particular category that can be to-
kenized in working memory to ‘go proxy’ for that cate-
gory [Prinz, 2002].
In other terms, proxytype theory considers concepts as tem-
porary constructs of a given category, activated (tokenized) in
working memory as a result of conceptual processing activi-
ties, such as concept identification, recognition and retrieval.
In its original formulation, however, proxytypes are de-
picted as monolithic conceptual structures, primarily in-
tended as prototypes [Prinz, 2002]. A revised view of this
approach has been recently proposed in the area of BICA [Li-
eto, 2014], hypothesizing the availability of a wider range of
representation types than just prototypes corresponding to the
kinds of representations postulated by the heterogeneous ap-
proach to concepts. In this sense, proxytypes are heteroge-
neous in nature.
Definition 2 (Heterogeneous Proxytypes). Heterogeneous
representations (such as prototypes, exemplars, etc.) for each
conceptual category are stored in long-term memory. They
can be activated and accessed by resorting to different cate-
gorization strategies. In this view, each representation has its
associated access procedures.
In the design of our system we followed the approach based
on heterogeneous proxytypes for both the representational
level (that is, we devised a hybrid knowledge base composed
of heterogeneous representations, each endowed with specific
reasoning mechanisms) and for the ‘proxyfication’ (that is,
the set of procedures implementing the tokenization of the
different representations in working memory). In the follow-
ing section we illustrate how the heterogeneous conceptual
representations can be implemented through the classical AI
paradigms and representational frameworks.
2.1 Representational Paradigms in AI
In Artificial Intelligence, and in particular in the area of
Knowledge Representation, several proposals have been car-
ried out to handle different aspects of conceptual informa-
tion (e.g., in processes such as learning and reasoning). A
classical distinction was drawn between symbolic and sub-
symbolic models. While sub-symbolic (connectionist) mod-
els were used for embedding knowledge structures by taking
inspiration from human-like organizations and processes, on
the other hand many forms of logic-based systems were de-
veloped mostly targeted on providing a clear formal seman-
tics, thus enabling forms of logically-valid automatic reason-
ing. Examples of these systems are the KL-ONE semantic
networks [Brachman and Schmolze, 1985]. In more recent
years, a tripartition of representational levels has been pro-
posed, where a further level is considered, the conceptual
level [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000; 2014]. This level of representation
is considered as intermediate between the symbolic level and
the sub-symbolic level, and is featured by a representation in
terms of conceptual spaces, i.e., geometrical representations
of knowledge (introduced in Section 3).
Such a tripartition provides several computational frame-
works to encode the different bodies of conceptual knowl-
edge. For example, the prototypical body of knowledge for a
given concept can be represented as follows: i) from a sym-
bolic perspective, in terms of frames [Minsky, 1975] or se-
mantic networks [Quillian, 1968]; ii) from a conceptual space
perspective, prototypes can be geometrically represented as
centroids of a convex region (more on this aspect later); iii)
from a sub-symbolic perspective, the prototypical knowledge
concerning a concept can, on the other hand, be represented
as reinforced patterns of connections in Artificial Neural Net-
works (ANNs). Similarly, for the exemplars-based body of
knowledge, both symbolic and conceptual space representa-
tions can be used, as well as the sub-symbolic paradigm. In
particular, exemplars can be represented as instances of a con-
cept in symbolic systems, as points in a geometrical concep-
tual space, or as a particular (local) pattern of activation in a
ANN. Finally, also for the classical body of knowledge it is
–at least in principle–, possible to use the same frameworks.
However, this seems to be a case where symbolic and con-
ceptual levels are more appropriate w.r.t. the sub-symbolic
one.
Summing up, all the different types of conceptual repre-
sentations can be implemented in cognitive artificial systems
and architectures. In addition, different computational mech-
anisms for “proxyfying” conceptual representations can be
applied. In the next Section we illustrate and discuss the rep-
resentational levels and the associated computational frame-
works we adopted for each type of body of knowledge.
3 The DUAL-PECCS System
As mentioned, the DUAL-PECCS relies on the heteroge-
neous proxytypes approach and on the dual process theory.
It is equipped with a hybrid knowledge base composed of
heterogeneous representations of the same conceptual enti-
ties: that is, the hybrid knowledge base includes prototypes,
exemplars and classical representations for the same concept.
Both prototypes and exemplars are represented at the con-
ceptual level (see Section 3.1), while classical information is
represented through standard symbolic formalisms (i.e., by
means of a formal ontology).
The retrieval of such representations is driven by different
process types. In particular, prototype and exemplar-based re-
trieval is based on a fast and approximate kind of categoriza-
tion, and benefits from common-sense information associated
to concepts. On the other hand, the retrieval of the classical
representation of concepts is featured by explicit rule follow-
ing, and makes no use of common-sense information. These
two differing categorization strategies have been widely stud-
ied in psychology of reasoning in the frame of the dual pro-
cess theory, that postulates the co-existence of two differ-
ent types of cognitive systems [Evans and Frankish, 2009;
Kahneman, 2011]. The systems of the first type (type 1) are
phylogenetically older, unconscious, automatic, associative,
parallel and fast. The systems of the second type (type 2) are
more recent, conscious, sequential and slow, and featured by
explicit rule following. We assume that both systems can be
composed in their turn by many sub-systems and processes.
According to the hypotheses in [Frixione and Lieto, 2012;
2014], the conceptual representation of our system includes
two main sorts of components, based on these two sorts of
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Figure 1: Heterogeneous representation of the tiger concept
processes. Type 1 processes have been designed to deal with
prototypes- and exemplar-based retrieval, while Type 2 pro-
cesses have been designed to deal with deductive inference.
The two sorts of system processes interact (Algorithm 1),
since Type 1 processes are executed first and their results are
then refined by Type 2 processes. In the implemented sys-
tem the typical representational and reasoning functions are
assigned to the System 1 (hereafter S1), which executes pro-
cesses of Type 1, and are associated to the Conceptual Spaces
framework [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000; 2014]. On the other hand,
the classical representational and reasoning functions are as-
signed to the System 2 (hereafter S2) to execute processes of
Type 2, and are associated to a standard ontological represen-
tation.
Figure 1 shows the heterogeneous representation for the
concept tiger, with prototypical and exemplar-based repre-
sentations semantically pointing to the same conceptual en-
tity. In this example, the exemplar and prototype-based rep-
resentations make use of non classical information. Namely,
the prototypical representation grasps information such as
that tigers are wild animals, their fur has yellow and black
stripes, etc.; the exemplar-based representations grasp infor-
mation on individuals (such as white-tiger, which is a partic-
ular tiger with white fur). Both sorts of representations acti-
vate Type 1 processes. On the other hand, the classical body
of knowledge is filled with necessary and sufficient informa-
tion to characterize the concept (representing, for example,
the taxonomic information that a tiger is a mammal and a
carnivore), and activates Type 2 processes.
In the following we introduce the two representational and
reasoning frameworks used in our system, by focusing i) on
how typicality information (including both prototypes and ex-
emplars) and their corresponding non monotonic reasoning
procedures can be encoded through conceptual spaces; and
ii) on how classical information can be naturally encoded in
terms of formal ontologies.
3.1 S1-S2: Conceptual Spaces and Ontologies
Conceptual spaces (CS) are a representational framework
where knowledge is represented as a set of quality dimen-
sions, and where a geometrical structure is associated to each
quality dimension. Instances can be represented as points in
a multidimensional space, and their similarity can be com-
puted as the intervening distance between each two points,
based on some suitable metrics (such as Euclidean and Man-
hattan distance, or standard cosine similarity).3 In this setting,
concepts correspond to convex regions, and regions with dif-
ferent geometrical properties correspond to different sorts of
concepts [Ga¨rdenfors, 2000].
Prototypes have a natural geometrical interpretation in con-
ceptual spaces, in that they correspond to the geometrical cen-
tre of a convex region. This can be thought of as a centroid,
that is the mean position of all the points in all dimensions.
This representation also allows us, given a convex region, to
associate each point to a certain centrality degree, that can be
interpreted as a measure of its typicality. This framework has
been extended to consider the exemplars, that are also repre-
sented as points in the multidimensional space. Conceptual
spaces can be also used to compute the proximity between
any two entities, and between entities and prototypes. Con-
cepts, in this framework, are characterized in terms of do-
mains; a domain is “a set of integral dimensions that are sep-
arable from all other dimensions” [Ga¨rdenfors, 2014]. Typi-
cal domain examples are color, size, shape, texture. In turn,
domain information can be specified along some dimensions:
e.g., in the case of the color domain, relevant dimensions are
hue, chromaticity, and brightness. Inference in conceptual
spaces is robust to incomplete and/or noisy information.
On the other hand, the representation of the classical infor-
mation regarding a given concept is demanded to classical
ontological formalizations. In this setting, ontologies pro-
vide the characterization of concepts in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions (if these conditions exists: as men-
tioned, most common sense concepts cannot be characterized
in these terms). Additionally, the ontological representations
are used by the S2 component (in our implementation it is
grounded on the OpenCyc ontology, one of the widest on-
tological resources currently available). In the next sections
we present the details regarding the categorization strategies
adopted in the DUAL-PECCS.
3.2 Categorization Pipeline of the DUAL-PECCS
The whole categorization pipeline works as follows. The in-
put to the system is a simple linguistic description, like ‘The
animal that eats bananas’, and the expected output is a given
category evoked by the description (e.g., the categorymonkey
in this case). After an Information Extraction (IE) step, the
input information is encoded into an internal format devised
to store conceptual spaces information, which is then used as
input in the categorization task by adopting the strategies that
will be described below.
3A full account of the semantic similarity calculated in the con-
ceptual spaces is out of the scope of this contribution; in the present
setting, distances are computed in a multi-dimensional space that
can be thought of as a vectorial model [Lieto et al., In Pressb].
Data: Linguistic d
Result: A class assignment, as computed by S1 and S2
1 trialCounter 0;
2 closedS1 = {;}
3 while trialCounter < maxTrials do
// conceptual spaces output
4 c S1(d, closedS1);
5 if trialCounter == 0 then c⇤  c ;
// ontology based consistency check
6 cc S2(d, conceptPointedBy(c));
7 if cc equals(conceptPointedBy(c)) then
8 return hc⇤, cci;
9 else
10 closedS1 add(conceptPointedBy(c))
11 end
12 ++trialCounter ;
13 end
14 cc S2(hd,Thingi);
15 return hc⇤, cci;
Algorithm 1: The S1-S2 categorization process.
A shallow IE approach has been devised, where the mor-
phological information computed from input sentences has
been used to devise a simple finite-state automaton describing
the input sentences’ structure (more on the input descriptions
in Section 5). This approach would not scale to handle more
complex sentences; its limitations are due to using morpho-
logical information, and in general are inherent in finite-state
machines (which prevents us from dealing with parentheti-
cal clauses, like relative clauses). We defer to future work
the adoption of richer language models. Despite these limita-
tions, however, it allowed us to complete the automatization
of the software pipeline going all throughout from the simple
linguistic input description used for the evaluation (that will
be described later) to its final conceptual categorization.
3.3 Dual Process Prototypes and Exemplars-based
categorizations
The overall control strategy implemented by DUAL-PECCS
regulates the flow of interaction between the S1 and S2 sys-
tems (it is thus referred to as S1-S2 categorization). Its un-
derlying rationale is to assess the approximate categorization
results obtained by Type 1 processes in S1 with the ontolog-
ical information and the deliberative processes of reasoning
implemented by S2. The S1-S2 categorization process can
be summarized as follows (Algorithm 1). The system takes
in input a textual description d and produces in output a pair
hc⇤, cci, the output of S1 and S2, respectively. If the catego-
rization result provided by S1 (based on the similarity calcu-
lation between the input and S1 representations) is consistent
with the ontology, then the categorization succeeded and the
category provided by S2 (cc) is returned along with c⇤, the
top scoring class returned by S1; otherwise the system evalu-
ates a fixed amount (maxTrials) of S1 candidates. In case all
the S1 candidates are inconsistent w.r.t. the ontology in S2,
the output of S2, computed independently of S1, is provided
along with c⇤. The control strategy implements a tradeoff be-
Data: Linguistic description: d; list of inconsistent
concepts: closedS1.
Result: A typicality based representation of a category.
1 S1EX categorizeExemplars(d);
2 if firstOf(S1EX, closedS1).distance(d) <
similarityThreshold then
3 return firstOf (S1EX, closedS1);
4 else
5 S1PR categorizePrototypes(d);
// in case of equal distance prefer
exemplars
6 typicalityCategorization sortResults(S1EX, S1PR);
7 return firstOf (typicalityCategorization, closedS1);
8 end
Algorithm 2: S1 categorization with prototypes and exem-
plars implementing the instruction in Algorithm 1: line 4.
tween ontological inference and the output of S1, which is
more informative but also formally less reliable.
The second categorization algorithm governing the reason-
ing mechanisms is executed within the S1 component (Al-
gorithm 2), and extends the previous model of categoriza-
tion by determining which kind of S1 output must be se-
lected and then checked against the deliberative S2 mod-
ule. In particular, the algorithm is designed to activate either
the prototypical-based or the exemplar-based representation,
based on the actual input description. The implemented pro-
cedure works as follows: when the input stimulus –in our case
a simple linguistic description– is similar enough to an exem-
plar representation (a threshold has been fixed to these ends),
the corresponding exemplar of a given category is retrieved.
Otherwise, the prototypical representations are also scanned
and the representation (prototype or exemplar) that is clos-
est to the input is returned. By following a preference that
has been experimentally observed in human cognition [Medin
and Schaffer, 1978], this algorithm favors the results of the
exemplars-based categorization if the knowledge-base stores
any exemplars similar to the input being categorized.
4 Integrating Dual-PECCS into ACT-R
The proposed system has been integrated into the cognitive
architecture ACT-R [Anderson et al., 2004]. In ACT-R, cog-
nitive mechanisms emerge from the interaction of two types
of knowledge: declarative knowledge, that encodes explicit
facts that the system knows, and procedural knowledge, that
encodes rules for processing declarative knowledge. In par-
ticular, the declarative module is used to store and retrieve
pieces of information (called chunks, featured by a type and
a set of attribute-value pairs, similar to frame slots) in the
declarative memory. Finally, the central production system
connects these modules by using a set of IF-THEN produc-
tion rules. We focused on the two following elements in ACT-
R: the Declarative Memory, the Working Memory buffers,
and the corresponding mechanisms of retrieval.
We have integrated the DUAL-PECCS heterogeneous rep-
resentational model in ACT-R by extending the notion of
chunk-based representation supported by such architecture.
In particular, differently from other efforts made to extend
the knowledge capabilities of ACT-R [Oltramari and Lebiere,
2012; Salvucci, 2014] based on the introduction of a new, ad-
hoc, external module of declarative memory, we have directly
integrated our hybrid knowledge base into the ACT-R declar-
ative memory. Besides, the dual process strategies of concept
categorization have been integrated into the ACT-R processes
and connected to the retrieval request of the Working Mem-
ory. More in detail: in the Extended Declarative Memory ev-
ery concept is represented as an empty chunk (that is, a chunk
having no information except for itsWordNet ID and a human
readable name), referred to by different kinds of external bod-
ies of knowledge (like prototypes and exemplars) acting like
semantic pointers. The novel categorization mechanism —
implemented by inserting a new retrieval request— activates
both the S1 and S2 categorization procedures. In particular,
in this setting, once the categorization result of S1 is pro-
vided, the activated representation in the Extended Declara-
tive long-term memory is proxyfied (i.e., stored in working
memory) in order to perform the S2 categorization check, in
the dual process perspective.
5 Evaluation
A dataset composed of 90 descriptions (corresponding to very
simple riddles) was collected and given in input to the im-
plemented system: namely, we selected 45 descriptions for
which an exemplar-based representation was expected to be
retrieved, and 45 descriptions for which a prototype-based
representation was expected to be retrieved. These stimuli
have been built by a multidisciplinary team composed of neu-
ropsychologists, linguists and philosophers in the frame of a
project aimed at investigating the brain activation of visual
areas in tasks of lexical processing even for very abstract con-
cepts. An example of such descriptions is “The big carnivore
with yellow fur and black stripes”, where the expected cate-
gory to be retrieved was tiger, and in particular its represen-
tation corresponding to the “prototype of tiger”; conversely,
a description such as “The big carnivore with white fur and
black stripes” was expected to lead as answer to “exemplar of
white tiger”.4
The expected categorical targets represent a gold standard,
since they correspond to the results provided by human sub-
jects within a preliminary psychological experimentation. In
the first experiment 30 subjects were requested to provide
the corresponding target concept for each description (i.e.,
in this case no description referred to exemplar-based rep-
resentations was provided) [Lieto et al., In Pressa]; in the
second experiment 10 subjects were requested to indicate the
target (prototype or exemplar) corresponding to descriptions
evoking both prototype- and exemplar-based representations.
Such experimental design was borrowed from the third exper-
iment described in [Malt, 1989].
We have considered a twofold experimental setting. In the
first case we tested the whole pipeline, where the salient in-
formation is extracted by starting from the linguistic descrip-
4A prototype of the system is available at the URL http://
goo.gl/sk9tJ1; the full list of descriptions is available at the
URL http://goo.gl/PDLo4J.
Table 1: The accuracy results (Table 1-a) and the analysis of
the proxyfication errors (Table 1-b).
a. Accuracy rates obtained for the CC-ACC and P-ACC metrics.
test CC-ACC P-ACC
with no IE 95.6% (86/90) 86.0% (74/86)
with IE 85.6% (77/90) 75.3% (58/77)
b. Analysis of the errors in the proxyfication (P-ACC metrics).
test Proxyfication errorEx-Proto Proto-Ex Ex-Ex
with no IE 12.8% (11/86) 1.1% (1/86) 0.0% (0/86)
with IE 18.2% (14/77) 0.0% (0/77) 6.5% (5/77)
tion, the corresponding representation is retrieved, proxyfied
and loaded in working memory according to the dual process
approach. The information extraction of the linguistic input
is not implemented in ACT-R, but it relies on the CoreNLP
Stanford Parser [Manning et al., 2014], which is used to con-
vert the textual description into a chunk request. This mea-
sure is intended to assess the robustness of the overall ap-
proach, from the input parsing to the final categorization. In
the second case we tested the heterogeneous proxytypes ap-
proach by directly starting with a manual encoding of the
linguistic stimuli in terms of chunk request: this measure is
intended to assess the accuracy in the categorization task of
the hybrid system, featured by dual process approach, hetero-
geneous representation and reasoning, proxyfication, integra-
tion in the ACT-R architecture, but no information extraction.
In both cases (all linguistic pipeline vs. clean input) we
recorded two distinct metrics:
i) Concept-categorization accuracy (CC-ACC metrics) This
metrics was designed to evaluate the final categorization, that
is the accuracy in retrieving the expected concept (in this case,
the wrong proxyfication did not count as error).
ii) Proxyfication accuracy (P-ACC metrics) This metrics was
designed to evaluate whether given in input a description
evoking a given concept, the expected proxyfied representa-
tion was retrieved. In this case the confusion between proto-
type and exemplar (or between exemplars) is scored as error
even if the expected category is returned.
5.1 Results and Discussion
The system obtained an accuracy of 95.6% in conceptual re-
trieval (that reduces to 85.6% when performing the IE step),
and 86.0% in the proxyfication task (75.3% in the setting with
the IE). These figures are reported in Table 1.
The results in the conceptual categorization are in line
with those previously reported in [Ghignone et al., 2013;
Lieto et al., In Pressa], although the dataset was presently
more diverse by including exemplars, as well. The results of
the whole pipeline (Table 1-a, second row) provide a baseline
for future implementations of the IE step; we observe that,
although producing 10% error either in the POS tagging or
in the IE step proper, this result is also in line with those re-
ported in [Lieto et al., In Pressb]. This fact shows that the
approach –devised to match the simple linguistic structures
in the considered stimuli, and which was expected not to gen-
eralize to handle further linguistic descriptions– maintains its
performance when dealing with a broader dataset. The IE step
significantly affects also the P-ACC metrics: that is, if we re-
strict to considering cases where the concept was categorized
as expected, the proxyfication step is performed correctly in
86.0% of descriptions with ‘clean’ input, and only in 75.3%
of cases with the Information Extraction step.
Table 1-b reports the detailed errors committed in the prox-
yfication phase; here we distinguish three cases. Provided
that proxyfication errors occur only when the concept has
been correctly categorized, three kinds of proxyfication er-
rors were recorded: an exemplar returned in place of an ex-
pected prototype (column Ex-Proto); a prototype returned in
place of an expected exemplar (column Proto-Ex), or by re-
trieving a wrong exemplar (e.g., siberian tiger in place of
malaysian tiger, column Ex-Ex). Notably, the vast majority
of errors are due to confusion between exemplars and proto-
types: in particular, in the 12.8% of the considered stimuli an
exemplar-proxyfied representation has been returned by the
system in spite of the expected prototype. This sort of error
raises to 18.2% in the implementation including the IE task.
This error was caused by the fact that in case exemplar based
representations in the KB are equipped with the typical infor-
mation matching the linguistic description being categorized,
then such representations are always favored w.r.t. their pro-
totypical counterpart (see Section 3.3, Algorithm 2). The rest
of errors are less relevant, except for the type Ex-Ex, where
we observe a 6.5% error rate, which is mostly due to the noisy
features extracted from the linguistic descriptions.
6 Conclusions
This paper has illustrated two main advancements, in that
DUAL-PECCS provides the heterogeneous proxyfication ap-
proach governed by the dual process theory with a working
implementation meantime integrating autonomous prototyp-
ical and exemplar-based categorization. Additionally, it has
been integrated into ACT-R, thus showing a good level of
compatibility with a general cognitive architecture. Although
there is room both for refining the theory and tuning the im-
plemented system, the obtained experimental results are en-
couraging. Further representational levels can be foreseen
that fit the needs of cognitive architectures, such as sensory-
motor representations, visual imageries, etc.. However, while
it would be possible to use the proposed framework to inte-
grate additional levels into the DUAL-PECCS (for example,
affordances can be thought of as prototypical sensory-motor
representations associated to a given concept), a complete ac-
count of these aspects is out of the scope of the current paper
and deserves further investigation.
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